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Up to now there was a general conviction that increasing unemployment and inflation have a 
negative impact on the government’s popularity. This was true for Germany as well, but it 
does not seem to hold any longer. This paper first reviews the results of earlier periods before 
presenting new results for the last part of the Kohl government after unification and for the 
Schröder government. While the results for the former show the known pattern, neither 
unemployment nor inflation is significant in the equations of the Schröder government, the 
latter has even the wrong sign. The missing impact of unemployment might be due to 
statistical reasons: the short observation period and the low variance of the explanatory 
variables. With respect to inflation, however, the citizens might have recognised that they 
cannot any longer hold the government responsible as the European Central Bank is 
performing monetary policy in Europe since 1999 and is, therefore, also responsible for price 
stability in Germany. 
JEL Code: H11. 






University of St. Gallen 
SIAW-HSG 
Bodanstrasse 8 







November 2009. A previous version of this paper has been presented at the Annual Meeting 
of the European Public Choice Society, Athens, April 5, 2009. – I am grateful for helpful 
comments by JAKOB DE HAAN (University of Groningen). 1  Introduction 
[1]  It is common knowledge that the development of unemployment and inflation has an im 
pact on the re election chances of a government: the higher the unemployment and inflation 
rates, the worse are – ceteris paribus – the prospects of a government to win the next election. 
There exists a lot of empirical evidence for this presumption, not only for Germany, but also 
for the United States, the United Kingdom, and many other countries.
1) The most often cited 
example is the rise of the National Socialists in Germany in the first years of the thirties of the 
last century, which can hardly be explained without reference to the world economic crisis of 
that time and the mass unemployment connected with it.
2) But the impact of these two vari 
ables on the electoral success (or failure) of German governments from the fifties to the nine 
ties can also be taken for sure, even if the corresponding evidence is based on survey and not 
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Figure 1:   Unemployment during the Schröder Government  
[2]  All this does no longer seem to hold for the Schröder Government from 1998 to 2005. 
When GERHARD SCHRÖDER started as German Chancellor, he told the voters that his perform 
ance should be evaluated according to his success in fighting unemployment. There was, 
                                                 
  1.  Surveys are presented by M. PALDAM (1981) as well as P. NANNESTADT and M. PALDAM (1994), for Ger 
many in particular by G. KIRCHGÄSSNER (1986). See also the contributions in Electoral Studies 19 (2000), 
issue 2/3. 
  2.  There is solid empirical evidence in this respect, even if it is sometimes stated that unemployment had no 
major relevance for the rise of the National Socialists. For this evidence see, for example, B.S. FREY and H. 
WECK HANNEMANN (1981). This holds despite the fact that – according to the results of J.W. FALTER et al. 
(1985) – with rising unemployment not so much the unemployed themselves but rather other groups of the 
population voted for the National Socialists. On the relation between economic development and the rise of 
National Socialism see also J.W. FALTER and R. ZINTL (1988) as well as A. V. RIEL and A. SCHRAM (1993).  − 2 − 
   
however, hardly any success. As Figure 1 shows, at the beginning of his government, unem 
ployment went somewhat down in West and, therefore, also in the whole of Germany, reach 
ing lowest (seasonally adjusted) values in May 2001 with 7.0 or 9.2 percent, respectively. But 
afterwards it increased more or less continuously again, reaching highest values in March 
2005 with 10.2 or 12.1 percent, respectively. Thus, German unemployment was very high 
even in historical comparison: in West Germany such high values have never been taken on 
since the beginning of the fifties.
3) In East Germany, there was no decline of unemployment, 
even at the beginning of the Schröder Government; starting with 16.6 percent in October 1998 
it more or less continuously rose up to its historical high of 19.4 percent in the first three 
months of 2005. This holds despite the fact that in 1998 Chancellor GERHARD SCHRÖDER 
gave top priority to the reconstruction of East Germany (“Aufbau Ost”).
4) Moreover, just be 
fore the general elections in 2002, when it became obvious that the aspired labour market 
goals could not be reached, a committee chaired by PETER HARTZ, a board member of Volks 
wagen AG, launched a labour market programme, called Hartz I to Hartz IV, which should 
reduce unemployment up to two millions. Though this programme was not without success, 
first achievements could only be observed at the end of the Schröder government, and the 
reduction of unemployment was far less than promised.
5) 
[3]  Nevertheless, as shown below, the empirical evidence that unemployment had a major 
impact on the survey results of the Schröder government and, therefore, also on its electoral 
success or defeat, respectively, is extremely thin; the corresponding results are far from any 
statistical significance. With respect to the inflation rate, they even have the ‘wrong’ sign. 
This might have different reasons, which will be discussed later. At the moment, we locate the 
somewhat curious fact that a government that promised to reduce unemployment but clearly 
failed has nevertheless been re elected in 2002, even if the margin was rather small. And in 
2005, when the government failed to become re elected again, the Social Democrats, the party 
of Chancellor GERHARD SCHRÖDER, were very close behind the Christian Democrats. Thus, 
they still were in the government up to October 2009, but in a coalition with the Christian 
Democrats, the new Chancellor, ANGELA MERKEL, being from this party.  
[4]  In the following, for the purpose of comparison, we first shortly recapitulate results of 
earlier German governments as documented in the literature (Section 2). The period of the 
Kohl government is discussed in somewhat more detail because up to today there are hardly 
any results available covering the whole period of this government.
6) In Section 3 results for 
the Schröder government are presented. In the final Section 4, possible reasons are discussed 
why we might be unable to find a significant impact of the economic development on the 
popularity of this government. 
                                                 
  3.  Source of the data: Time series data bank of the German Bundesbank 
(http://www.bundesbank.de/statistik/statistik_zeitreihen.php). 
  4.  See for this: Aufbau Ost wird Chefsache, Süddeutsche Zeitung, November 11, 1998, p. 6. 
  5.  See for this, for example, B. BOOCKMANN et al. (2007). 
  6.  The results in L.P. FELD and G. KIRCHGÄSSNER (1998, 2000) do only cover the period up to 1996 but not 
the last two years of this government.  − 3 − 
   
2  Popularity Functions for Earlier Periods  
[5]  Results for the first 35 years of the Federal Republic of Germany are presented, for ex 
ample, in G. KIRCHGÄSSNER (1986).
7) With monthly data for the period from January 1951 to 
October 1966, dominated by the Christian Democrats and the two Chancellors KONRAD ADE 
NAUER und LUDWIG ERHARD, we get the following results for the two major parties:
8) 
(1a)  CDUt   =   14.448  + 0.736 CDUt 1  –  0.457 URt  –  0.256 IRt  –  0.010 TRt  +  û1,t 
    (4.74)  (14.87)  ( 2.61)  ( 2.93)  ( 1.02) 
 
2 R   =  0.84,    ˆ h  =   2.26,   DF  =  185. 
(1b)  SPDt   =   9.713  + 0.680 SPDt 1  +  0.014 URt  +  0.148 IRt  +  0.024 TRt  +  û2,t 
    (4.76)  (12.97)  (0.10)  (2.08)  (2.66) 
 
2 R   =  0.81,    ˆ h  =   2.89,   DF  =  185. 
CDU  and  SPD  are  the  shares  of  the  two  major  parties  in  the  surveys  of  the  Institut  für 
Demoskopie, Allensbach, UR is the seasonally adjusted unemployment rate, IR is the infla 
tion rate of the consumer price index (compared with the same month of the preceding year), 
and TR a linear trend. 
[6]  These results show the well known picture: There was high unemployment after World 
War II; the further it has been reduced, the larger the support for the CDU/CSU became. In 
this process, it mainly absorbed the supporters of small parties, in particular the ‘German 
Party’ (Deutsche Partei, DP) and ‘Community of Expellees and Disenfranchised’ (Bund der 
Heimatvertriebenen und Entrechteten, BHE) which were its coalition partners in the begin 
ning. Thus, it hardly affected the opposition. This is different with respect to inflation. Losses 
of the Christian Democrats due to rising inflation mainly benefited the Social Democrats. Fi 
nally, we find a positive long run trend for the SPD and a negative one for the CDU/CSU. 
The latter one is, however, not statistically significant. 
[7]  There are no separate estimates for the three years of the first Grand Coalition from 1966 
to 1969, as this period is too short to perform reliable estimates. Minimally, you need a period 
of six, better eight years in order not to be too vulnerable for spurious correlations that might 
appear during different phases of the business cycle. B.S. FREY and F. SCHNEIDER (1979) in 
clude this period in their estimates ranging from 1951 to 1969. However, because they use 
annual data, it is totally impossible to draw any conclusions with respect to these three obser 
vations: the results are completely dominated by the CDU/CSU governments up to 1966.  
                                                 
  7.  There, the theoretical model behind these estimates is presented. This is not replicated here. – Originally, 
the results are from G. KIRCHGÄSSNER (1976, p. 117). There are also presented additional results as well as 
detailed descriptions of the data. 
  8.  See G. KIRCHGÄSSNER (1986, p. 427). Popularity data are from the Institut für Demoskopie, Allensbach. 
They are collected more or less regularly on a monthly basis. Missing observations are linearly interpo 
lated; if more than one survey has been undertaken within one month, averages are used. – The numbers in 
parentheses are the t values of the estimated parameters, 
2 R is the adjusted multiple coefficient of determi 
nation, h the value of the Durbin h Test and DF the number of degrees of freedom of the t statistics. − 4 − 
   
[8]  Using monthly data from January 1971 to August 1982, the following estimates for the 
period  of  the  social liberal  coalition  with  the  Chancellors  WILLY  BRANDT  and  HELMUT 
SCHMIDT are given in G. KIRCHGÄSSNER (1986, p. 427):
9) 
(2a)  CDUt   =   10.833  + 0.733 CDUt 1  +  0.341 URt  +  0.161 IRt  +  û1,t 
    (5.68)  (17.97)  (3.99)  (1.51) 
  SER  =  1.597,    ˆ h  =   0.29,   DF  =  135. 
(2b)  SPDt   =   15.149  + 0.733 SPDt 1  –  0.609 URt  –  0.404 IRt  +  û2,t 
    (6.43)  (17.97)  ( 5.35)  ( 2.88) 
  SER  =  1.820,    ˆ h  =  0.77,   DF  =  135. 
The governing party, the SPD, loses votes if inflation, and in particular if unemployment 
rises. The latter effect was mainly responsible for the loss of power in 1982. The CDU/ CSU 
profits from rising unemployment and inflation, the significance of the latter effect is, how 
ever, slightly below the 10 percent level. 
[9]  Considering the time of the Kohl government and using monthly data, L.P. FELD und G. 
KIRCHGÄSSNER (1998, p. 551) present the following estimates for the period from January 
1984 to December 1996 (156 observations) for the government (CDU/CSU and F.D.P.) and 
for the opposition (SPD and Greens):
10) 
(3a)  GPt   =   98.597  +  0.602 GPt 1  +  0.251 GPt 2  +  0.147 ( –3.602 URt   
    (5.43)  (11.51)  (4.68)    ( 2.74) 
    –  8.388 CURt –  4.599 IRt  –  5.170 D9103  +  6.847 D9407)  +  û1,t 
    ( 1.87)  ( 3.11)  ( 3.46)  (4.65) 
 
2 R   =  0.769,   SER  =  1.495,   Q(10)  =  11.215,   J. B.  =  0.566. 
(3b)  OPt   =   6.328  +  0.602 OPt 1  +  0.251 OPt 2  +  0.147 ( 3.279 URt   
    (0.39)  (11.51)  (4.68)    (2.74) 
    +  6.859 CURt  +  2.652 IRt  +  4.053 D9103  –  5.050 D9407)  +  û2,t 
    (1.74)  (2.05)  (2.78)  ( 3.51) 
 
2 R   =  0.557,   SER  =  1.463,   Q(10)  =  16.516,   J. B.  =  0.812. 
GP is the share of the government, consisting of the Christian and the Free Democrats, OP the 
share of the (parliamentary) opposition, consisting of the Social Democrats and the Green 
Party. CUR is the covered unemployment rate. This was the first time that this variable has 
been included into an estimation of a German popularity function, the reason for it being that 
this rate was extraordinarily high just after unification. D9103 and D9407 are dummy variables 
                                                 
  9.  SER is the standard error of the regression. – The two equations are estimated as a system using FIML. 
This ensures that the coefficients of the lagged endogenous variables are identical in both equations. More 
over, no values for the multiple determination coefficient are reported. 
 10.  These two equations are part of an estimated system including a third equation for the other parties. Q(k) is 
the value of the Box Pierce Q Statistic for autocorrelation of the residuals with k degrees of freedom, J. B. 
the value of the Jarque Bera Statistic to test for normality of the residuals. In contrast to the estimates 
above, in these equations the long run coefficients of the exogenous variables are presented. − 5 − 
   
for March 1991 and July 1994. In March 1991, Chancellor HELMUT KOHL broke his promise 
that he would not increase taxes in order to finance German unification. After the state elec 
tion in Saxony Anhalt in June 1994 the first de facto coalition between the SPD and the for 
mer communist party PDS came about. As the results show, both events had a severe impact 
on the popularity of the government as well as the opposition. 
[10] With respect to the economic variables, we see again the usual picture: the coefficients of 
the unemployment and inflations rates are in the government's equation significantly negative 
and in the opposition's equation significantly positive. The same holds for the impact of the 
covered unemployment rate, but its significance is only at the 10 percent level. 
[11] For the new federal states in East Germany only 54 observations were available, from 
July 1992 to December 1996. The following results were derived:
11) 
 (4a)  GPt   =   79.921  +  0.212 GPt 1  +  0.179 GPt 2  +– 0.609 ( 1.893 URt   
    (7.07)  (2.47)  (2.23)    ( 2.78) 
    –  0.839 CURt  – 0.516 IRt  –  0.292 TRt  +  0.306 BSt)  +  û1,t 
    ( 4.10)  ( 2.80)  ( 3.41)  (2.51) 
 
2 R   =  0.576,   SER  =  2.129,   Q(10)  =  19.734,   J. B.  =  2.051. 
(4b)  OPt   =   21.390  +  0.212 OPt 1  +  0.179 OPt 2  +– 0.609 (– 1.647 URt   
    (1.71)  (2.47)  (2.23)  ( 2.20) 
    –  0.832 CURt  + 0.288 IRt  +  0.320 TRt  –  0.211 BSt)  +  û2,t 
    ( 3.66)  (1.49)  (2.90)  ( 1.60) 
 
2 R   =  0.769,   SER  =  1.495,   Q(10)  =  11.215,   J. B.  =  0.566. 
BS is a variable representing the ‘Back Swing Effect‘, i.e. that, just before the new election, 
many voters go back to the party they voted for last time. This effect can often be observed; a 
corresponding variable has already been included in the estimations of the seminal paper by 
C.A.E. GOODHARD and R.J. BHJANSALI (1970).
12) 
[12] We find again the same pattern. In comparison with the estimates for West Germany we 
find much smaller coefficients of the economic variables,
13) but the coefficient of the covered 
unemployment rate is much more significant. The latter might be due to the fact that after the 
unification covered unemployment was much more important in the new federal states. 
                                                 
 11.  See L.P. FELD and G. KIRCHGÄSSNER (1998, p. 563). This is again part of an estimated system with the 
popularity of the other parties as the third variable. In East Germany, this third variable represents mainly 
the PDS.  
 12.  This ,Back Swing Effect‘ before an election is part of the ‘electoral cycle’. This cycle describes the follow 
ing pattern: After an election the government loses support, first in larger and later on in smaller steps. Just 
before the next election, it can, however, regain a large part of these voters. See for this, for example, G.T. 
SOLDATOS (1994). 
 13.  When interpreting the coefficients it has to be taken into account that the two variables take on much higher 
values in East Germany, and the variance is also much higher than in West Germany.  − 6 − 
   
[13] In the following, we only consider the period after unification. There, we have data for 
West and East as well as the whole of Germany. If we only include the unemployment and 
inflation rates as economic variables into the equation, and with monthly data from December 
1991 to September 1998 (82 observations), for the whole of Germany we get the following 
results for the popularities of the government and the opposition (using the definitions given 
above):
14) 
(5a)  GPt   =   24.702  +  0.688 GPt 1  –  1.992 URt  –  0.691 IRt+  5.864 D9407  +  û1,t 
    (5.65)  (11.14)  ( 5.40)  ( 3.58)  (34.23) 
 
2 R   =  0.824,   SER  =  1.399,   Q(5)  =  1.654,   J. B.  =  0.608. 
(5b)  OPt   =   7.864  +  0.645 OPt 1  +  0.804 URt  +  0.512 IRt  – 1.778 D9407  +  û2,t 
    (3.22)  (7.50)  (4.71)  (2.97)  ( 9.18) 
 
2 R   =  0.729,   SER  =  1.297,   Q(5)  =  7.462,   J. B.  =  1.032. 
Both economic variables have in both equations the expected signs and are highly signifi 
cantly different from zero. The results also indicate that the collaboration between the SPD 
and the PDS, starting in June 1994 in Saxony Anhalt did benefit the government and hurt the 
opposition; but the quantitative effect on the opposition is much smaller than the one on the 
government.
15) 
[14] If we perform the same estimates for West Germany from February 1991 to September 
1998 with 92 observations, and include the West German unemployment rate (URW), we get 
the following results: 
(6a)  GPt   =   20.715  +  0.727 GPt 1  –  0.807 URWt  –  0.728 IRt  –  4.760 D9103 
    (4.52)  (11.14)  ( 4.02)  ( 3.19)  ( 11.07) 
    + 5.861 D9407  +  û1,t 
    (37.92) 
 
2 R   =  0.765,   SER  =  1.459,   Q(5)  =  5.092,   J. B.  =  1.506. 
(6b)  OPt   =   11.016  +  0.643 OPt 1  +  0.698 URWt  +  0.3.00 IRt  +  3.490 D9103 
    (3.40)  (9.17)  (3.51)  (1.21)  (9.231) 
    – 4.524 D9407  +  û2,t 
    ( 25.10) 
 
2 R   =  0.712,   SER  =  1.482,   Q(5)  =  7.157,   J. B.  =  1.296. 
                                                 
 14.  The estimates have been performed using EViews, Version 5.1. They cover those periods for which we 
have political as well as economic data. To account for possible heteroskedasticity and/or autocorrelation, 
we applied Newey West standard errors for the t statistics. If we use the traditional standard errors, we get 
similar but somewhat less significant results for the effects of the economic variables. – The popularity se 
ries are again from the Institut für Demoskopie, Allensbach. Data for the (seasonally adjusted) unemploy 
ment rates and for the consumer price index are taken from the data bank of the German Bundesbank. 
    (http://www.bundesbank.de/statistik/statistik_zeitreihen.php). 
 15.  For all estimated equations presented for this period it holds that – given the results of the Box Pierce and 
Jarque Bera statistics – we neither find significant autocorrelation of the residuals, nor can we reject the 
null hypothesis that these residuals are normally distributed. − 7 − 
   
[15] Because we have some additional observations, we can also include the dummy variable 
for the broken electoral promise of the Kohl government, D9103. It shows the expected (and 
from earlier estimates known) impact: There is a considerable popularity loss of the govern 
ment benefiting the opposition. With two exceptions, all other results are similar to those for 
the whole of Germany: First, inflation does not have a significant impact on the oppositions’ 
popularity, and the size of the respective coefficient is only somewhat more than half of the 
size in the equation for the whole of Germany. Between 1991 and 1998, a reduction of infla 
tion might have benefited the government but hardly hurt the opposition. Second, the coeffi 
cient of the dummy variable D9407 is much higher. Apparently, the collaboration between the 
SPD and the PDS in Saxony Anhalt was detrimental for the opposition in the old federal 
states, and, because this happened just before the general election in 1994, it saved the elec 
toral victory for the CDU/CDU, but in the new federal states the SPD and/or the Greens might 
rather have benefited from it. 
[16] This can also be shown when we estimate these equations for the new federal states. 
There we have, however, only data from December 1993 to September 1998 and, therefore, 
only 58 observations:
16) 
(7a)  GPt   =   23.928  +  0.438 GPt 1  +  0.233 GPt 2  –  0.791 UREt  –  0.159 IRt 
    (3.38)  (2.67)  (1.56)  ( 3.14)  ( 0.26) 
    + 1.908 D9407  +  û1,t 
    (2.70) 
 
2 R   =  0.832,   SER  =  1.879,   Q(5)  =  8.958,   J. B.  =  0.194. 
(7b)  OPt   =   3.963  +  0.388 OPt 1  +  0.142 OPt 2  +  0.892 UREt  +  0.821 IRt 
    (1.08)  (2.94)  (0.91)  (3.00)  (1.76) 
    + 9.918 D9407  +  û2,t 
    (10.06) 
 
2 R   =  0.748,   SER  =  2.062,   Q(5)  =  8.023,   J. B.  =  0.016. 
URE is the East German unemployment rate. Contrary to the situation in the old federal 
states, the SPD and/or the Greens benefit from the collaboration between the SPD and the 
PDS, but these gains cannot at all equalise the losses in West Germany. These gains come at 
the expense of other parties (OTP), i.e. mainly at the expense of the PDS, as can be shown in 
the following equation: 
(7c)  OTPt   =   10.983  +  0.270 OTPt 1  +  0.187 OTPt 2  +  0.236 UREt  –  0.809 IRt 
    (2.91)  (1.72)  (1.20)  (2.26)  ( 1.37) 
    – 11.571 D9407  +  û3,t 
    ( 26.597) 
 
2 R   =  0.662,   SER  =  1.788,   Q(5)  =  4.175,   J. B.  =  0.922. 
                                                 
 16.  In contrast to other estimations, we use here (as in L.P. FELD und G. KIRCHGÄSSNER (1998)) two lagged 
endogenous variables. The coefficients of the two periods lagged endogenous are not significantly different 
from zero, but without their inclusion the Box Pierce Q Statistic indicates considerable autocorrelation of 
the residuals.  − 8 − 
   
Whenever the situation on the East German labour market deteriorates, the government loses 
and the (parliamentary) opposition gains votes. The other parties, in particular the PDS, do 
not gain from this (at least not during this period). Inflation does not seem to have a major 
impact on the voters’ decisions: only the coefficient in the opposition's equation is signifi 
cantly different from zero, and only at the 10 percent level, while the two other coefficients 
are far away from any statistical significance. The reason for this might be that the price de 
velopment is different in the old and new federal states. While the price index for Germany 
mainly represents the West German development, it might hardly be representative for East 
Germany.
17)  
[17] Taking all results together, during the first five decades of the Federal Republic of Ger 
many unemployment and inflation had a considerable impact on the voters’ decisions, at least 
as far as they are reflected in the survey results. When unemployment and/or inflation rose, 
the government lost support, even if this was not always fully to the benefit of the (parliamen 
tary) opposition. With respect to unemployment this also holds for the new federal states, but 
not necessarily also with respect to inflation. Besides these economic impacts there have been 
political events which had a considerable short run impact on voting behaviour, even if their 
long run impact might have been of minor importance. If those happened just before a general 
election, they might, however, have had considerable impact on the electoral results. This 
does not only hold for the collaboration of the SPD and the PDS in Saxony Anhalt starting in 
summer 1994, and probably allowed Chancellor HELMUT KOHL to stay in power after the 
election of October 16, 1994, but also for the rather clumsy behaviour of Chancellor KONRAD 
ADENAUER after the building of the Berlin Wall on August 13, 1961. He had to pay the costs 
for his misjudgements of the political situation in the general election on September 17, 1961, 
where he lost the absolute majority which before had seemed to be very safe.
18) On the long 
run effects of such events one can only speculate. However, at least it holds that the collabora 
tion of the SPD and the PDS in the new federal states, starting in 1994, did not impair the 
electoral victory of the SPD four years later in the general election on September 27, 1998. 
3  Results for the Schröder Government 
[18] Compared to earlier results, there is a dramatic change of the impact of the economic 
variables on political popularity when we consider the Schröder government. For unemploy 
ment, we do no longer find a significant impact, and the impact of inflation, if it exists at all, 
might even go into the ‘wrong’ direction. As shown in the following, this holds for East as 
well as for West Germany (and, therefore, also for the whole of Germany), and quite inde 
pendent of the concrete specification of the estimated equation. 
[19] Because the government can hardly be hold responsible for the economic situation just 
after its election, we exclude (as has been done in earlier papers as well) the first year of the 
new government. Thus, with monthly data from October 1999 to September 2005 we have 72 
                                                 
 17.  Separate data for West and East Germany are not available. 
 18.  See for this G. KIRCHGÄSSNER (1977, p. 512, FN 12). − 9 − 
   
observations.
19) Using the simplest specification, using OLS we get the following results for 
the whole of Germany: 
(8a)  GPt   =   12.240  +  0.799 GPt 1  –  0.484 URt  +  0.656 IRt  +  û1,t 
    (2.08)  (10.85)  ( 1.43)  (1.59) 
 
2 R   =  0.770,   SER  =  1.806,   Q(5)  =  10.996,   J. B.  =  10.639. 
(8b)  OPt   =   5.181  +  0.869 OPt 1  +  0.237 URt  –  0.816 IRt  +  û2,t 
    (1.88)  (15.32)  (0.60)  ( 2.08) 
 
2 R   =  0.841,   SER  =  1.817,   Q(5)  =  10.825,   J. B.  =  4.587. 
(8c)  OTPt   =   1.069  +  0.812 OTPt 1  +  0.025 URt  +  0.344 IRt  +  û3,t 
    (0.67)  (12.36)  (0.19)  (1.61) 
 
2 R   =  0.721,   SER  =  0.911,   Q(5)  =  3.413,   J. B.  =  10.785. 
The results differ from those of earlier periods not only with respect to the impact of the eco 
nomic variables, but also that we now find, at least at the 10 percent level, significant autocor 
relation  of  residuals  in  the  equations  of  the  government,  consisting  of  the  SPD  and  the 
Greens, and of the parliamentary opposition, consisting of the CDU/CDS and F.D.P.. More 
over, the null hypothesis of normality of the estimated residuals can be rejected even at the 1 
percent level in the equations of the government and of the other parties.
20) To take account of 
this, we used the Newey West procedure to correct the variances of the estimated parameters. 
However, this hardly changes the results. 
[20] Unemployment does not seem to have an impact in any of the three equations. If we only 
consider the size of the estimated parameters, the impact is smaller than in the nineties, but 
comparable with those up until 1982. However, contrary to those earlier results, in the period 
of the Schröder government the results are far from any conventional significance level. This 
does not change if we estimate the three equations as a system of seemingly unrelated regres 
sions and perform a Wald test to check whether unemployment has a significant impact on 
this system. With a value of 1.876, two degrees of freedom and a p value of 0.39, the corre 
sponding χ
2 statistic is far from any statistical significance. Even more astonishing are (at 
least at a first glance) the results for inflation. The higher the inflation rate, the lower is the 
share of the CDU/CSU and the F.D.P.. Thus, we even get a ‘wrong’ sign in the equation of 
the opposition. However, the total effect on the system of equations is also not significant: we 
get a χ
2 statistic of 4.301 and a p value of 0.12 (with 2 degrees of freedom). 
                                                 
 19.  The results are robust with respect to small changes of the sample size.  
 20.  In the equation of the opposition the significance is just above the 10 percent level.  − 10 − 
   
Table 1:   Popularity Functions for the Schröder Government 
Dependent 
Variable 
Coefficient of  Dummy 
Variables 




GP   0.484 
( 1.43) 
0.656 
(1.59)  no  0.770  10.996(*)  10.639** 
GP   0.277 
( 0.86) 
0.606 
(1.49)  yes  0.871  15.846**  0.902 
OP  0.237 
(0.60) 
 0.816* 
( 2.08)  no  0.841  10.825(*)  4.588 
OP  0.293 
(0.79) 
 0.682(*) 
(1.91)  yes  0.900  17.188**  1.385 
OTP  0.025 
(0.19) 
0.344 
(1.61)  no  0.721  3.413  10.785** 
OTP   0.110 
( 1.33) 
0.161 


























(1.61)  no  0.532  5.025  0.445 
OTPw   0.028 
( 0.25) 
0.204 
(0.90)  yes  0.599  3.293  0.781 
East Germany 
GPE   0.317 
( 0.95) 
0.373 
(0.60)  no  0.571  7.646  5.781(*) 
GPE   0.023 
( 0.07) 
0.463 
(0.75)  yes  0.688  4.844  7.843* 
OPE  0.970** 
(2.73) 
 1.530** 
( 3.16)  no  0.779  1.910  0.440 
OPE  0.797* 
(2.52) 
 1.259** 
( 2.87)  yes  0.825  4.855  0.567 
OTPE   0.452 
( 1.56) 
0.968* 
(2.18)  no  0.802  6.535  6.896* 
OTPE   0.637* 
( 2.36) 
0.662 
(1.43)  yes  0.842  5.471  1.067 
The numbers in parentheses are the t statistics of the estimated parameters. '**', '*' or. '(*)' indicate that the 
corresponding null hypothesis can be rejected at the 1, 5, or 10 percent significance level, respectively. Q(k) 
is the value of the Box Pierce Q Statistic for autocorrelation of the residuals with k degrees of freedom, 
J. B. the value of the Jarque Bera Statistic to test for normality of the residuals. − 11 − 
   
[21] The rejection of the normality hypothesis of the estimated residuals might be due to some 
events during this period that are quite independent from economic development. In the gov 
ernment’s equation we find a positive outlier in October 2002, the month of the election, and 
a negative one two months later in December 2002. There might have been some disillusion 
ment after the election. In the opposition’s equation we find negative outliers at the beginning 
of 2000. This might be in connection with the scandal of illegal donations to the CDU. More 
over, in December 2002 the opposition might have benefited from the disillusionment of the 
government. In the equation of the other parties, we find a positive outlier in July 2005 which 
might be a reaction to the merger between the PDS and the ‘Electoral Alternative Social Jus 
tice’ (Wahlalternative Soziale Gerechtigkeit, WASG), to build up the new ‘Left Party’, in the 
campaign for the federal election in 2005. 
[22] We can represent these events with dummy variables, taking on the value of one in the 
respective months and zero elsewhere.
21) Most of the estimated parameters are significant, 
some even very highly. Correspondingly, as can be seen from Table 1, the values of the mul 
tiple determination coefficients clearly rise. This has, on the other hand, hardly any effect on 
the estimated impact of the economic variables; there are no major changes neither of the size 
nor of the significance of the estimated coefficients. Unemployment does not have any sig 
nificant impact. The impact of the inflation rate is only significant at the 10 percent level; it 
still goes, however, into the wrong direction: the opposition loses and does not gain votes 
with rising inflation. 
[23] As the results in Table 1 also show, the estimated coefficients in the equations for the 
whole of Germany are very close to those in the equations for West Germany. There, the co 
efficients of the unemployment rate are in all equations far from any statistical significance as 
well. This is somewhat different in the equations for East Germany. There, labour market de 
velopment also has hardly any effect on the government’s popularity, but the parliamentary 
opposition benefits from increasing unemployment at the expense of the other parties, mainly 
the PDS.  
[24] The impact of inflation on the popularity of government and opposition that can hardly be 
explained mainly exists in East Germany. There, the negative impact on the opposition’s 
popularity is even significant at the 1 percent level. In the equation without dummy variables 
we find a positive impact on the popularity of the other parties which is significant at the 5 
percent level. Thus, rising inflation benefits the PDS at the expense of the CDU/CSU.  
[25] One might object that the approach to reach these results (which is the traditional one 
when estimating popularity functions) does not take into account that the variables might be 
non stationary. Thus, the results might not be very meaningful. It is, however, difficult to ar 
gue that these variables are non stationary, as they are bounded between zero and one.
22) Nev 
                                                 
 21.  Altogether, we use 5 dummy variables: for January 2000, February 2000, October 2002, December 2002 as 
well as July 2005.  
 22.  This would be different for logistic transformations of the popularity data. For the data we use this would, 
however, hardly lead to different results, because the level of the government’s popularity, for example, is 
correlated with 0.997 with its logistic transformation.  − 12 − 
   
ertheless, it might be that the variables are so close to non stationarity that models for such 
variables are better suited to represent the generating process of these data. On the other hand, 
even if the data are non stationary, OLS estimates for the levels of the data still lead to consis 
tent estimates. The problem is, however, that the estimated variances are downwards biased. 
Thus, we can hardly trust the test results. 
[26] The time series used are, however, rather short. Thus, the power of unit root and cointe 
gration tests is rather low. In such a situation, we can expect that the null hypotheses can 
hardly be rejected and/or that we find contradictory results. Nevertheless, such tests can be 
performed. For the period from November 1998 to September 2005, the results of applying 
the Dickey Fuller test (ADF) as well as the Kwiatkowski Phillips Schmidt Shin test (KPSS) 
are given in Table A1 in the Appendix. The former takes the non stationarity of the series as 
null hypothesis,  the  latter  the  stationarity.
23)  We  get  some  conflicting  results.  Both  null 
hypotheses can be rejected for the government’s popularity in the equation for the whole of 
Germany; for the KPSS test at the 1 percent and for the ADF test at the 10 percent signifi 
cance level. A similar result holds for the popularity of the opposition in the new federal 
states. The majority of the results indicate, however, that the popularity as well as our eco 
nomic data might be realisations of non stationary processes or that models for such processes 
are better able to statistically represent the processes generating these data, respectively. 
[27] Taking this into account and applying the Johansen Procedure we do not find any indica 
tion for cointegration between unemployment and the popularity series. This is independent 
of whether we include one or two popularity series together with the corresponding unem 
ployment rate into the system of equations. Due to the small sample size this procedure might, 
however, be highly problematic in our case.
24) Thus, we employed the Engle Granger proce 
dure as an alternative. The results are presented in Table A2. They are not really better. The 
estimates might be super consistent, but they are, as the small values of the R
2 show, highly 
biased. In two cases, where the test result might make us believe that there is cointegration, 
the values of the adjusted R
2 are even negative. This indicates that the popularity series are 
rather stationary than that a relation between non stationary variables exists. The only case 
where we find a – at least at the 10 percent level – significant cointegrating relation is be 
tween the government’s popularity and unemployment in the equation for the whole of Ger 
many. But the multiple correlation coefficient is again very low. All these results indicate that 
there was no relation between unemployment and inflation on the one and the popularity se 
ries on the other side in this period, at least not a stable one. Thus, there is a basic difference 
between the period of the Schröder government and those of all earlier governments.  
                                                 
 23.  On the different philosophies behind these two test procedures see U.K. MÜLLER (2005). A description of 
the test procedures for unit roots and cointegration is, for example, given in G. KIRCHGÄSSNER and J. 
WOLTERS (2007, Chapters 5 and 6).  
 24.  The results are very sensitive with respect to small changes of the sample size, i.e. on the assumption since 
when voters hold the government responsible for economic development.  − 13 − 
   
4  Concluding Remarks: Possible Reasons for the Differences 
[28] What does this imply? Do we have to take leave from the concept of popularity and vot 
ing functions and can or even should we assume that there will be no relation anymore be 
tween economic development and the electoral success of German governments in the future? 
Such conclusions would certainly go too far. But what is the appropriate conclusion? 
[29] The results can be discussed from two points of view: a statistical and a substantive one. 
Taking on the statistical perspective it has to be mentioned that the sample size of 6 years (or 
72 observations) is relatively small. Thus, spurious independence or correlations cannot be 
excluded. Once a future German government will again survive more than two electoral peri 
ods we will get better data to draw such far reaching conclusions.
25) Moreover, during this 
period the variances of the two economic variables were rather low. The variance of the infla 
tion rate was only 0.310, i.e. only 21 percent of 1.501, the value it took on under the Kohl 
government. A similar result holds for the unemployment rate; in West Germany its variance 
was only 58 percent and in East Germany even only 17 percent of the variance during the 
Kohl government. The smaller the variance of a variable is, the more difficult it is – ceteris 
paribus – to get statistically significant results. This holds in particular if the sample size is 
small. 
[30] Moreover, other events had a much stronger effect on the popularity of the government 
and the different parties during this period than economic development. The dummy variables 
which represent at least some of these events increase, for example, the adjusted R
2 in the 
equation of the government’s popularity for the whole of Germany compared with a first or 
der autoregressive process from 0.765 by 0.103 to 0.868, while the two economic variables 
increase it only by 0.005 to 0.770. This could have an impact on the size and the significance 
of the estimated coefficients, however, only if these other variables would be correlated with 
the economic ones. But this is not the case. If we regress the unemployment rate on the 
dummy variables, we get an adjusted R
2 of  0.011, and for the inflation rate of  0.046. Thus, 
from a statistical point of view, the economic variables are totally independent of the dummy 
variables, i.e., there was – at least in a statistical sense – no relation between those other 
events which had a major impact on the government’s popularity and the economic develop 
ment. This is plausible, if we consider, for example, the scandal and the crises of the CDU in 
2000 or the Iraq War in 2003. This independence is also reflected in the fact that the inclusion 
of the dummy variables had hardly any effect on the estimated effects of the economic vari 
ables, as the results in Table 1 show.  
[31] To test whether the effects of the economic variables have been really different in the 
Schröder government compared to the Kohl area, we estimated the popularity functions for 
both periods together allowing for structural breaks in all variables. Then we performed Wald 
test for the equality of the coefficients of the economic variables in both periods. The results 
                                                 
 25.  As the results for the Kohl government after unification show, it is at least sometimes possible to get mean 
ingful results even with smaller sample sizes. Thus, the small sample size does not necessarily have to be 
the only reason for our results.  − 14 − 
   
are given in Table 2. We get hardly any significant results for the unemployment rate, but 
nearly always significant results for the inflation rate. Thus, the insignificance of the esti 
mated impact of unemployment might be due to the fact that the sample is rather small and 
does not necessarily indicate a behavioural change, while the estimated coefficients of the 
inflation rate indicate such a change. 
 
Table 2:   Differences of the Estimated Parameters 
Dependent Variable  Coefficient of 
Unemployment Rate  Inflation Rate 
Germany 






































The numbers in parentheses are the corresponding t statistics of the estimated parameters. '**', '*' or. '(*)' 
indicate that the corresponding null hypothesis can be rejected at the 1, 5, or 10 percent significance level, 
respectively. 
 
[32] The question is how far voters really hold the government responsible for economic de 
velopments. Of course, governments usually try to exculpate themselves for bad economic 
developments, sometimes even rightly, but they do not always succeed. On the other hand, 
they  always  claim  authorship  for  positive  economic  developments,  quite  independent  of 
whether they really contributed to them or not. Thus, we have to distinguish how far (i) gov 
ernments are really responsible, (ii) governments claim to be responsible, and (iii) govern 
ments are hold responsible by the electorate for economic development.  − 15 − 
   
[33] The answers should be different for the two variables we employed, the unemployment 
and inflation rates. Even if it is often stated that employer and employee organisations are 
mainly responsible for labour market development, from the beginning of his government 
GERHARD SCHRÖDER claimed to be responsible. The Hartz legislation in 2002 demonstrated 
that the government has means to influence this development, even if the main effect of this 
legislation occurred after its demission.
26) Insofar it is astonishing that the estimates presented 
above do hardly provide evidence that labour market development had an impact on the dif 
ferent popularity series. 
[34] This is different with respect to inflation. There, it might even be astonishing if voters 
(still) hold the government responsible. In a weaker sense, this was also true for former gov 
ernments.  The  German  Bundesbank  and  not  the German government  was  responsible  for 
monetary policy, and the independence of the Bundesbank was fixed in a law. There existed, 
of course, indirect influences; the federal government was mainly, for example, responsible 
for filling the leading positions in the Bundesbank.
27) Moreover, the government could also 
put pressure on the Bundesbank, and this to some effect.
28) Nevertheless, the possibilities of 
the German government to influence monetary policy were rather limited. Moreover, with the 
start of the floating between the German Mark and the U.S. Dollar at the beginning of the 
seventies and the new monetary policy of the German Bundesbank, it was declared that infla 
tion is mainly a monetary phenomenon and monetary policy is able to manage it. Thus, it was 
hardly possible to hold the government responsible for inflation.
29) Insofar, it might be rather 
astonishing that the inflation rate had a significant impact on the Brandt/Schmidt and Kohl 
governments, even if this impact was less pronounced than the one of the unemployment rate. 
[35] Since January 1999, and blatantly since the change of the DM to the Euro in January 
2002, it is obvious that the situation is quite different. It is no longer the German Bundesbank, 
but the European Central Bank that is responsible for monetary policy in Europe and, there 
fore, also for the development of prices in Germany. To make the government responsible for 
this is apparently nonsense. Insofar, it is no surprise that most of the corresponding coeffi 
cients in Table 1 are not significantly different from zero.
30) If we assume that voters take a 
responsible decision we should not suppose that they hold the government responsible for 
something it is not responsible, it cannot be responsible, and does also not claim to be respon 
sible. 
                                                 
 26.  On the effect of the labour market reforms see, for example, SACHVERSTÄNDIGENRAT (2007, S. 323ff.). 
 27.  See for this R. VAUBEL (1997). 
 28.  See for this B.S. FREY and F. SCHNEIDER (1981). 
 29.  This  does  not  exclude  that  politics  can  have  a  short run  impact.  Before  1972,  i.e.  during  the  Bretton 
Woods system of fixed exchange rates, the government was even more impotent with respect to inflation. 
However, at that time the notion that inflation is mainly a monetary phenomenon was much less common, 
even among economists. Thus, it is plausible that in such a situation voters hold the government responsible 
for price development.  
 30.  A problem are rather those few coefficients which are statistically significant with the ‘wrong’ sign. They 
might be seen as statistical artefacts.   − 16 − 
   
[36] Thus, we might conclude that inflation will no longer play a role for the decisions of 
German voters. In contrast to this, they might still hold it responsible for the labour market 
development. Once a government would succeed in staying in power for more than two elec 
toral terms, we might get significant results again. And if we desist from the missing statisti 
cal significance, the results for the Schröder government show, after all, the same (expected) 
pattern as the results of former governments, and the quantitative effects are still not negligi 
ble. 
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Appendix 
 
Table A1:   Results of Unit Root Tests 
Variable  ADF Statistic  KPSS Statistic 
GP   2.619(*)  0.780** 
OP   2.168  0.833** 
OTP   2.533  0.418(*) 
UR   0.651  0.588* 
GPW   2.333  0.869** 
OPW   2.403  0.833** 
OTPW   3.499*  0.265 
URW   0.622  0.530* 
GPE   3.822**  0.120 
OPE   2.737(*)  0.696* 
OTPE   2.167  0.477* 
URE   1.998  1.099** 
IR   1.959  0.373(*) 
The tests have been performed for the levels of the time series. '**', '*' or. '(*)' 
indicate that the corresponding null hypothesis can be rejected at the 1, 5, or 
10 percent significance level, respectively. Critical values are taken from J.G. 
MACKINNON (1991). The lag length of the ADF test has been determined by 
the Hannan Quinn criterion. − 18 − 
   
 
Table A2:   Results of the Engle-Granger CointegrationTests 
Dependent 
Variable 
Coefficient of the 
Unemployment Rate 
2 R   ADF Statistic 
GP   2.741 
( 5.81)  0.316   3.183(*) 
OP  3.094 
(5.24)  0.272   2.025 
OTP   0.352 
( 1.35)  0.012   2.346 
GPW   2.979 
( 6.31)  0.353   2.451 
OPW  2.869 
(5.32)  0.278   2.004 
OTPW  0.109 
(0.64)   0.008   3.212(*) 
GPO   0.304 
( 0.53)   0.010   3.727* 
OPO  3.567 
(5.53)  0.294   2.615 
OTPO   3.353 
( 5.27)  0.274   2.650 
ˆ t  is the value of the Dickey Fuller Statistic to test for cointegration. '*' or '(*)'  indicate that 
the corresponding null hypothesis can be rejected at the 5 or 10 percent significance level, 
respectively. Critical values are taken from J.G. MACKINNON (1991). 
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